



# **User Distributions in Shard-based Blockchain Network: Queueing Modeling, Game Analysis, and Protocol Design**

Canhui Chen, Qian Ma, Xu Chen, and Jianwei Huang

- Canhui Chen, Qian Ma, and Xu Chen are with Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
- Jianwei Huang is with The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China



# Framework

---

1. Background and Motivation


2. System Model

3. Shard-based Blockchain Game


4. Dynamic Sharding Protocol

5. Conclusion

# Background and Motivation



# Cross-shard Transaction Problems




How to reduce the cross-shard transaction?

- Longer transaction confirmation time
- Higher transaction fee

# Participants in Shard-based Blockchain


**Difference:** Our work focus on the user perspective!







# Participants in Shard-based Blockchain

User distribution will directly affect the number of cross-shard transactions



# Current User Distribution in Shard-based Blockchain


- A user is represented by its address.
- A user is allocated to the shard using some fixed rules (e.g., based on the least significant bits).
- This allocation is similar to the **random and uniform distribution**.



**As the number of shards increase, the cross-shard transactions will dominate.**

# Dynamic Shard Selection

- Generate a number of addresses and pick up the address that is allocated to the certain shard.
- Initiate a **cross-shard transaction** to transfer assets to the new address.







- **Key Question 1:** How good is such random user distribution in terms of system transaction performance?
- **Key Question 2:** Is there a transaction-aware user distribution achieves a better system performance than the random user distribution and no user has the incentive to deviate from?

# Outline

---




1. Background and Motivation

2. System Model

3. Shard-based Blockchain Game





4. Dynamic Sharding Protocol

5. Conclusion




**A shard-based blockchain system model**

# Community Detection



## Community detection results

# Queueing Model



**Figure** Illustration of the queueing model for shard-based blockchain. Each shard is modeled as an M/M/1 queue, and two shards form an open Jackson queueing network.



# Average Transaction Confirmation Time and Transaction Fee

LEMMA 1. *The average transaction confirmation time for a user of category  $k$  in shard  $i$  under user distribution state  $R$  is*

$$W(i, k, R) = \frac{1}{q_k} \left( \sum_{m \neq i}^S \sum_{n=1}^K \left( Q^{(m)} + Q^{(i)} \right) \frac{R(m, n)}{r_n} T(k, n) + \sum_{n=1}^K \frac{R(i, n)}{r_n} T(k, n) Q^{(i)} \right). \quad (5)$$

LEMMA 2. *The average transaction fee for a user of category  $k$  in shard  $i$  under user distribution state  $R$  is*

$$F(i, k, R) = \frac{1}{q_k} \left( \sum_{j=1}^K T(k, j) \frac{R(i, j)}{r_j} f_{intra} + T(k, j) \left( 1 - \frac{R(i, j)}{r_j} \right) f_{cross} \right).$$

The average transaction confirmation time and the average transaction fee is related to

- Current user distribution
- User's category
- User's shard selection

The users' dynamic shard selection can be modeled as a game

# Outline

---



1. Background and Motivation

2. System Model

3. Shard-based Blockchain Game

4. Dynamic Sharding Protocol

5. Conclusion



# Shard-based Blockchain Game

---

- Users' utility is related to
  - Average transaction confirmation time
  - Average transaction fee

$$U(i, k, R) = -W(i, k, R) - \beta F(i, k, R),$$

- Users have partial control regarding **which shard to join**.
- The **users' dynamic shard selection** will affect the queueing performance of each shard, leading to **variable transaction confirmation times and transaction fees**, which thus forms the **shard-based blockchain game**.





# Equilibrium Analysis

**Definition 1** (*Nash Equilibrium*). A population state  $R^*$  is a Nash equilibrium of the shard-based blockchain game if for any  $R^*(i, k) \neq 0$  we have

$$U(i, k, R^*) \geq \max_{j \in \mathcal{S}} U(j, k, R^*_{(k,i,j)}), \forall k \in \mathcal{K}, i \in \mathcal{S}.$$

**Theorem 1** A shard-based blockchain may not possess a Nash equilibrium.

**Definition 2** (*Approximate Nash Equilibrium*). A population state  $R^*$  is an  $\epsilon$ -approximate Nash equilibrium of the shard-based blockchain game if for any  $R^*(i, k) \neq 0$  we have

$$U(i, k, R^*) \geq \max_{j \in \mathcal{S}} U(j, k, R^*_{(k,i,j)}) - \epsilon, \forall k \in \mathcal{K}, i \in \mathcal{S}.$$

$\epsilon \geq 0$  is the gap from a Nash equilibrium, and can be understood as the maximum switching cost that a user can tolerate for transferring to another shard, e.g., **cross-shard transaction fee**.



# Algorithm for Efficient Equilibrium

Heuristic rules for equilibrium distribution

- Users of the same category should be **randomly and uniformly distributed** in their selected shards.

$$\forall k \in \{1, \dots, K\}, \forall i \in \mathcal{X}_k, R(i, k) = \frac{r_k}{|\mathcal{X}_k|}.$$

- Users of different categories should be distributed in **different** shards, otherwise, they should be distributed **identically**.

$$\forall j, k \in \{1, \dots, K\}, \mathcal{X}_j \cap \mathcal{X}_k = \emptyset \text{ or } \mathcal{X}_j = \mathcal{X}_k.$$



# Algorithm for Efficient Equilibrium

## Algorithm 1 Search for efficient equilibrium Greedy

```

1: Sort the user category list such that we have  $r_1q_1 \geq r_2q_2 \geq \dots \geq r_Kq_K$ .
2: for  $k = 1$  to  $K$  do
3:    $T = \emptyset$ .
4:   for  $n = 1$  to  $S - |\cup_{i=1}^{k-1} \mathcal{X}_i|$  do
5:      $C = \{|\cup_{i=1}^{k-1} \mathcal{X}_i| + 1, \dots, |\cup_{i=1}^{k-1} \mathcal{X}_i| + n\}$ .
6:     Distribute users in category  $k$  into shards  $C$  based on the heuristic rule (1) and construct the distribution  $R_C$ .
7:     if  $T \neq \emptyset$  and  $U(*, i, R_T) > U(*, i, R_C)$  then
8:       break Congestion avoidance
9:     end if
10:    if  $U(*, i, R_C) > -\infty$ , i.e., the system is stable then
11:       $T = C$ .
12:       $u = \sum_{i=k+1}^K U(*, i, R')r_i / \sum_{i=k+1}^K r_i$ , where  $R'$  is the user distribution with users in category  $k+1, \dots, K$  distributing in shards  $\{|\cup_{i=1}^{k-1} \mathcal{X}_i| + n + 1, \dots, S\}$ .
13:      if  $U(*, k, R_C) > u$  then
14:        break
15:      end if
16:    end if
17:  end for

```

```


18:    $\mathbb{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_{k-1}\} \cup \{T\}$ . Constraint of heuristic (2)
19:    $\mathcal{X}_k = \arg \max_{\mathcal{X} \in \mathbb{X}} U(*, k, R'')$ , where  $R''$  is the distribution after distributing users in category  $k$  into shards  $\mathcal{X}$  based on heuristic (1).
20:   Distribute users in category  $k$  into shards  $\mathcal{X}_k$  based on heuristic (1).
21:   while there exists a user who has the incentive to move from shard  $i$  to shard  $j$  do
22:      $\mathcal{P} = \{m | i \in \mathcal{X}_m \text{ or } j \in \mathcal{X}_m, m = 1, \dots, K\}$ .
23:      $\mathcal{X} = \cup_{m \in \mathcal{P}} \mathcal{X}_m$ .
24:     Redistribute users of category  $m$  into shards  $\mathcal{X}$  based on rule (1) and update  $\mathcal{X}_m = \mathcal{X}, \forall m \in \mathcal{P}$ .
25:   end while Guarantee for equilibrium
26: end for
27: return  $R$ , where  $R$  is the final user distribution.

```


# Experiment Results

## Performance of Algorithm 1

- Polynomial time
- Low computational complexity and high efficiency




(a) Running time of Algorithm 1 with fixed  $S$




(b) Running time of Algorithm 1 with fixed  $K$

# Experiment Results


- Lower average transaction confirmation time (ATCT)
- Higher system throughput (TPS)
- Near-optimal performance



(a) ATCT with 2 shards



(b) ATCT with 4 shards



(c) TPS of different user distributions

# Outline

---



1. Background and Motivation

2. System Model

3. Shard-based Blockchain Game

4. Dynamic Sharding Protocol

5. Conclusion




# Dynamic Sharding Protocol

---

- **Validator Redistribution Epoch:** **validators** will be randomly distributed to different shards.
- **User Redistribution Epoch:** **users** will be redistributed to different shards based on the proposed algorithm.
- **Validator Vote and System Reconfiguration Epoch:** validators in all shards will **vote** to decide whether to redistribute users and collect the block statistics to decide whether to change the **number of shards** in the system.



# Dynamic Sharding Protocol








# User Distribution Table (UDT)

---

- All the validators maintain **a global user distribution table**
- UDT **maps** each user address to his shard
- UDT only need to record the **mapping information** of the users that initiated or received at least  $b$  ( $b > 1$ ) transactions in the previous user distribution epoch
- UDT is **small** enough to be stored in the **memory cache**
- The address that does **not** lay in the UDT will be allocated to the shard in the fixed and deterministic way, for example, using the least-significant bits of the address.



# User Distribution Table (UDT)





# User Redistribution Process

---

- Validators in shard  $i$  generate a **statistics block** and broadcast it.
- Validators will construct a **transaction network**.
- All the validators run the **community detection algorithm** to classify users into different categories.
- All the validators run the **proposed Algorithm** to redistribute users to different shards and construct the user distribution table.
- Validators should broadcast the user distribution table to make it **consistent globally**.




# Validator Vote Process

---

- Validators in shard  $i$  **vote** in the shard. If more than 50% validators vote for redistribution, the shard  $i$  will be marked as “**vote for redistribution**”
- If more than  $2/3$  of shards are marked as “**vote for redistribution**”, the **user redistribution process** will be conducted.



# Validator Vote Process





# System Reconfiguration Process

---

- Validators in shard  $i$  collect the historical block and **transaction statistics** from the last time of user redistribution, and broadcast it to other validators.
- If more than 80% blocks in shard  $i$  **exceed** 80% of the **maximum block size**, and the average **transaction fee** is at least 50% **higher** than that in the previous user redistribution epoch, shard  $i$  will be marked as “**busy shard**”.
- If more than 80% blocks in shard  $i$  are **below** 20% of the **maximum block size**, and the average **transaction fee** is at least 50% **lower** than that in the previous user redistribution epoch, shard  $i$  will be marked as “**idle shard**”.




# System Reconfiguration Process

---

- If more than 80% shards are “**busy shard**”, the system will **double** the number of shards and redistribute users.
- If more than 80% shards are “**idle shard**”, the system will **halve** the number of shards and redistribute uses.
- Note: there exists a constraint between the number of shards and the number of validators.




# System Reconfiguration Process









# System Reconfiguration Process



# Performance of the Dynamic Sharding Protocol



(a) User redistribution with the evolution of transaction pattern





(b) Validator vote and user redistribution with the concentration of transactions

The dynamic sharding protocol  
 (a) **Adapt** to the dynamic change of the user transaction pattern.  
 (b) **Rebalance** the user distribution.

The property of **equilibrium** can maintain the system stability in long term.

# Performance of the Dynamic Sharding Protocol



The dynamic sharding protocol

(c) **Increase the number of shards**, maintain system stability and boost the system performance.

(d) **Decrease the number of shards**, maintain system security, increase system utility and motivate validators.

(c) System reconfiguration and user redistribution with the increase in transactions

(d) System reconfiguration and user redistribution with the decrease in transactions

# Outline

---



1. Background and Motivation

2. System Model

3. Shard-based Blockchain Game

4. Dynamic Sharding Protocol

5. Conclusion



# Conclusion

---

- An **open Jackson queueing network** model to characterize the transaction dynamics of the shard-based blockchain.
- A novel **shard-based blockchain game** and explore various equilibria under different transaction patterns.
- An **efficient equilibrium finding algorithm** of low complexity, which can achieve an equilibrium with a near-optimal system performance.
- A novel **sharding protocol with dynamic user distributions**, which can maintain a good long-term performance in a dynamic environment.



**Thanks**